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ABSTRACT
For the last few years we have studied the diusion of pri-
vate information about users as they visit various Web sites
triggering data gathering aggregation by third parties. This
paper reports on our longitudinal study consisting of mul-
tiple snapshots of our examination of such diusion over
four years. We examine the various technical ways by which
third-party aggregators acquire data and the depth of user-
related information acquired. We study techniques for pro-
tecting against this privacy diusion as well as limitations
of such techniques. We introduce the concept of secondary
privacy damage.
Our results show increasing aggregation of user-related
data by a steadily decreasing number of entities. A hand-
ful of companies are able to track users' movement across
almost all of the popular Web sites. Virtually all the pro-
tection techniques have signicant limitations highlighting
the seriousness of the problem and the need for alternate
solutions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols|applications
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Privacy, Privacy Enhancing Technologies
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union's Privacy directive [7] denes an
\identiable person" as \one who can be identied, directly
or indirectly, by reference to an identication number or
to one or more factors specic to his physical, physiologi-
cal, mental, economic, cultural or social identity." It is well
known that combinations of dierent data elements can lead
to uniquely identifying a person. Privacy literature has in-
troduced terms like de-identication (stripping identity in-
formation from data) and re-identication (ability to relate
supposedly anonymous data with actual identities). Con-
cerns about user privacy have risen dramatically with the
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increased dependence on the Internet for a wide variety of
daily transactions that leave trails to be left in many loca-
tions. Web terms like cookies are widely known and modern
browsers provide privacy protection choices.
A common refrain is that any perceived loss of privacy
emanating from normal actions on the Internet does not
amount to actual loss of privacy as `personally identiable
information' (PII) is not gathered, assembled, or retained.
While evidence for this claim is not available neither is there
convincing proof that the data that has been gathered over
the 16 years of Web's existence amounts to PII. The wide-
spread popularity of the Web indicates that most users ei-
ther do not know or do not care about any perceived loss of
privacy. However, recent concerns about identity theft and
news stories of privacy breaches are increasingly changing
how users think about their privacy.
Our thesis is that there are causes for concerns about po-
tential loss of PII based on the growth and aggregation of
information tracking resulting from users' activities on the
Web. Gathering a certain amount of private information is
essential for applications: it is impossible to sell books over
the Internet without obtaining name, credit card informa-
tion, and address. Such e-commerce sites are often diligent
with the supplied information for practical and legal rea-
sons. However, signicant amount of in-depth tracking by a
large fraction of popular (and not so popular) Web sites is
also widespread.
We do not know if the data that has been and is being
gathered can denitely be translated to PII; however it is
hard to ignore the concentration and breadth of data being
acquired. Aggregation of data by sophisticated technical
means has been augmented recently by direct acquisitions
of companies (along with their longitudinal data).
We do not claim that all data acquisition is of concern,
nor do we assert that users should block private information
from being gathered in all cases. It is important for users
to know what is being gathered, how, and whether it is nec-
essary. Ideally, users should reach a modus vivendi whereby
they consent to what is being tracked by selected sites to
an approved extent. If it is possible for them to interact
without their privacy being diused they should be able to
do so. Our work is an initial step in trying to move towards
such an informed consensus that balances the needs of sites
and the legitimate privacy needs of users.
Yet, there is little data about such privacy diusion on
the Internet resulting from individual user's actions involv-
ing visits to popular Web sites. In earlier work, we took a
rst cut at examining the problem of privacy diusion onthe Web [13, 11]. In this paper, we present a longitudinal
perspective of our study spanning four years exploring the
nature and extent of tracking of user-related information by
a large set of popular Web sites. Ours is the rst such study
to examine privacy diusion over time that covers a broad
set of technologies used for tracking and the potential for
various measures against such tracking.
The organization for the paper is as follows. Section 2 enu-
merates the list of privacy related data elements currently
being tracked on the Web and the techniques used for such
tracking. Section 3 describes the methodology of our lon-
gitudinal study together with its technical scope. Section 4
presents the results of our longitudinal study and reasonable
inferences that can be drawn. Section 5 demonstrates lim-
itations of current privacy protection techniques. Section 6
presents arguments of how PII could be gleaned by combin-
ing the data elements already being gathered with ambient
information and other popular applications that are not cov-
ered in our study. Section 7 raises a new issue of secondary
privacy damage where the actions of one user can leak in-
formation about another user an aggregator of information.
We conclude in Section 8 with a summary and a look at
future work. We note that the code we used to gather data
is available for repeating our experiments on any subset of
Web sites of interest to readers.
2. PRIVACY ELEMENTS
We now enumerate the list of privacy related data ele-
ments currently being tracked on the Web and the tech-
niques used for such tracking. While our list is not exhaus-
tive, we capture the most common elements and techniques.
A user's visit to a single Web site (what we term a rst-
party site) often results in multiple HTTP requests being
sent to numerous servers under the control of dierent ad-
ministrative entities. Some requests are necessary to obtain
the content being requested from the site owner's servers or
Content Distribution Network (CDN) sites, while others are
needed to fetch advertisements. Yet others are purely for
the purpose of tracking a user's movements on the Web. All
sites visited other than the rst party are termed as third-
party sites. Although CDNs are indeed capable of track-
ing user's movements, we discount their role when they dis-
tribute content on behalf of the rst parties. We also note
that some tracking is useful: cookies allow users to visit the
site again and have their prole re-used to avoid having to
re-enter information. Note that both rst and third parties
send cookies. Other tracking mechanisms are justied by
the claim that they enhance the user's experience; e.g., the
use of JavaScript.
Behavioral tracking is one of the oldest techniques em-
ployed on the Web. Behavioral tracking allows for monitor-
ing user Web accesses across multiple unrelated Web sites.
A common application is to see if a particular ad displayed
on a site resulted in the user clicking on it. The common
technique is to use a cookie that can be correlated across
multiple sites; the aggregator knows that it is the same user
who has visited these sites. The denition of a `user' is some-
what nebulous: it could be simply the IP address present in
the client HTTP request. But in combination with simple
ambient information it may be possible to ensure that it
represents a single user rather than multiple people send-
ing requests from that IP address. For example, examining
the access patterns over time, and the time periods and fre-
quency of accesses, it may be easy to distinguish users even
if multiple users are behind the same address. Web bugs
(the 1x1 pixel GIF images) are another way to extract in-
formation about sites users are visiting. The advantage of
behavioral tracking is thus the ability to create a prole of
a user [16]. Use of tracking cookies is fairly ubiquitous [19]
and there are known techniques to avoid them [22].
Some third parties provide Web analytics services for traf-
c measurement, user characterization, connectivity and geo-
location services. Often a JavaScript le is downloaded to a
client browser which in addition to the computation creates
and updates rst-party cookies. The scripts send informa-
tion back to the third-party site through identifying URLs
(containing characters like '?', '=', or '&') that are used to
pass parameter values and information to the server. Note
that JavaScript does not have to be downloaded as a sepa-
rate object but can be present inline in the original HTML
downloaded.
Cookies, being opaque strings can encode any informa-
tion that a sending server desires and can change over time.
JavaScript, being executable code, can carry out computa-
tions at the client's side although it has limited access to user
data. Scripts do have access to information in the browser
including cached objects and the history of visited links [10].
Along with cookies and results of JavaScript execution, the
tracking sites have all the regular information available in a
typical HTTP request: sender's IP address, user-agent soft-
ware information, current and previous URL (via Referer
header), email address (From header), language preference
(Accept-Language header), etc. Beyond these, depending
on the site visited search strings, passwords, account num-
bers, etc. may also be available, although typically only to
the rst-party site.
Behavioral tracking sites like doubleclick.net and tacoda.
net have been around for well over a decade (although both
have been recently acquired by larger companies). Promi-
nent Web analytics domains are google-analytics.com,
quantserve.com and omniture.com.
3. LONGITUDINAL STUDY
In the following we describe the methodology of our lon-
gitudinal study along with its technical scope. Our study
involved downloading around 1200 popular Web sites (from
more than 1000 unique servers) over ve epochs of time
between October 2005 and September 2008 and examin-
ing the additional Web sites visited by the browser. The
study was automated using a Firefox extension [6] to drive
the retrieval of the each rst-party site while the extension
recorded all of the resulting third-party sites visited
1. We
also examined the presence of cookies, JavaScript, and iden-
tifying URLs in the downloaded pages. The study set in-
cluded English-language sites obtained across various cate-
gories from Alexa's popular sites [3], rst used in [12]. Our
study used the same data set of popular Web sites over all
epochs, although we also examined the impact of using the
current Web site membership for the Alexa categories.
We also examine two important subsets of the broadly
popular Web sites: a) consumer sites, where users do not
just browse but supply additional personal information such
as credit card numbers and b) duciary sites, where users
1A proxy was used to record visited sites in the October
2005 epoch.provide a variety of personal information including bank ac-
count numbers, and other personally identiable informa-
tion.
In analyzing the use of third-party sites across this set of
rst-party sites, which are identied based on their server,
we rened the approach dened in [13] to merge third-party
servers from the same organization. In that work, we used a
\domain" approach where third-party servers with the same
2nd-level domain are merged into a single third-party do-
main
2. Thus the third-party servers walmartcom.112.2o7.
net and timecom.122.2o7.net are merged into the 2o7.net
third-party domain.
The weakness of this approach is that it fails to capture
cases where what appeared to be a server in one organization
(e.g. w88.go.com) was actually a DNS CNAME alias to a
server (go.com.112.2o7.net) in another organization (Om-
niture). We found these type of relationships could be cap-
tured with an \adns" approach where all third-party servers
sharing the same set of authoritative DNS servers (ADNSs)
were merged into the same third-party.
In this work, we found neither of this approaches alone
to be satisfactory for merging third-party servers together
for analysis. While the ADNS approach overcomes weak-
nesses in the domain approach it has other drawbacks. For
example, DNS for some third-party servers is provided by
DNS services, such as ultradns.net. These services do not
represent the source of the content. Similar issues arise with
content distributed networks (CDNs), which were originally
developed to deliver content behalf of rst-party servers. In-
creasingly CDNs are being used to serve content, such as
JavaScript or images with cookies attached, on behalf of
other third-party servers. For example, an Akamai server
is used to serve content for the third-party server pixel.
quantserve.com. This third-party content belongs to
quantserve.com and should not be grouped with all other
content of servers with an Akamai ADNS.
Because of these shortcomings we use a rened approach
in this work, which we call the \root" domain, to group
servers. We start with the domain of the third-party server,
but we also obtain the ADNS of the third-party server as
well as the ADNS of the rst-party server. If the ADNS of
the third-party server is not the same as that of the rst-
party server and the ADNS is not that of a known CDN
or DNS service then we use the ADNS as the root do-
main. Thus the root domain of www.google-analytics.com
is google-analytics.com and the root domain of pixel.
quantserve.com is quantserve.com even though its content
is served by the Akamai CDN. Similarly the root domain
of adopt.specificclick.net is specificclick.net as its
ADNS is from the ultradns.net domain. Finally, the root
domain of w88.go.com is omniture.com because its content
is served by an Omniture server.
We use these third-party root domains to examine the dif-
fusion of information about user viewing habits across our
set of popular rst-party sites. In [13], we dened the notion
of a privacy footprint to examine this diusion. The foot-
print metric shows the number and diversity of third-party
sites visited as a result of visiting rst-party sites. Here, we
track this footprint longitudinally by examining the penetra-
2In cases where the Top-Level Domain (TLD) is a country
code and the TLD is subdivided using recognizable domains
such as \com" or \co" then the domain approach groups
servers according to the 3rd-level domain.
tion of the most used third-party root domains, which are
in a position to aggregate information about user viewing
habits, across the set of rst-party sites. We also exam-
ine the depth of third-party tracking in terms of the num-
ber of these third-party domains that are present on each
rst-party site. Finally, we show the impact of a new fac-
tor: economic acquisition, where one aggregator purchases
another|instantly and sometimes signicantly increasing
its footprint.
4. RESULTS
This section describes results from using the basic method-
ology for data gathering and analysis described in the pre-
vious section.
4.1 Longitudinal Results of Top Third-Party
Root Domains
Focusing on the penetration of third-party root domains
amongst the set of rst-party servers in our basic test data
set, Figure 1 rst shows the cumulative penetration of the
top-10 root domains at the time of each of the ve epochs
in our longitudinal study. The results show that the top-10
domains were used by 40% of rst-party servers in Oct'05,
but had extended to 70% of the rst-party servers by Sep'08.
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Figure 1: Extent of Top-10 Third-Party Root Do-
mains in Each Epoch and Specic Contribution of
Top Domains
Figure 1 also shows the extent amongst rst-party servers
for the top root domains in the Sep'08 epoch of our study.
These domains were generally at or near the top of all epochs.
Apart from google-analytics.com and quantcast.com,
which were initially not present in data from early epochs,
the other domains in Figure 1 were at or near the top in all
epochs. These results show that beyond a general increase
in the footprint of all domains, the footprint of some domain
has grown signicantly. The domain doubleclick.net had
the largest penetration in the rst epoch and has more than
doubled its penetration since. The quantserve.com domain
is only present in the latter two epochs, but is now one of the
top few domains. The google-analytics.com domain was
not present in our rst epoch yet has leapfrogged to near
the top over the course of our study.4.2 WhatAre These TopThird-Party Domains
Doing?
Given the spread of these third-party domains amongst
rst-party servers, it is important to understand what these
third-party domains are doing. Originally, third-party cook-
ies were used to track users, but techniques employing com-
binations of rst-party cookies and JavaScript execution have
also become common.
Rather than study all third-party domains, we focused on
those with at least a one-percent penetration in a measure-
ment epoch. Using this list as a starting point, we studied
traces of requested objects, consulted the browser cookie
database, and examined downloaded third-party JavaScript
to better understand the nature of content served by servers
in these domains. We primarily focused on the use of cook-
ies by these third-party domains for tracking and whether
these domains were using JavaScript to track users in con-
junction with use of rst- or third-party cookies. We found
four types of third-party domains that track users amongst
the set we examined.
1. Third-party domains that only set third-party cook-
ies to track users and do not make use of JavaScript
for additional tracking. From Figure 1 these include
doubleclick.net, atdmt.com and 2o7.net.
2. Third-party domains that use JavaScript with state
saved in rst-party cookies. A prominent domain of
this type is google-analytics.com, which uses a piece
of JavaScript code to interrogate the rst-party cook-
ies of the site and then retrieves an object using an
identifying URL for sending information back to its
third-party server.
3. Third-party domains that use both third-party cookies
and JavaScript to set rst-party cookies. The domain
quantserve.com is an example of such a third-party
domain that use JavaScript as well as both rst-and
third-party cookies to track user actions.
4. Third-party domains that do not use JavaScript for
setting rst-party cookies nor use third-party cookies.
However these domains are involved by serving ads
URLs with tracking information, such as adbrite.com
or adbureau.net. Others are owned and operated by
a third-party domain that does tracking. For exam-
ple, instances of 2mdn.net virtually always occur in
conjunction with doubleclick.net.
Another potential means for third parties to track users
is \Flash cookies," which are Local Shared Objects (LSOs)
maintained by the Adobe Flash Player [9]. These LSOs
are stored on a user's computer in a local repository main-
tained by the Adobe Flash player. We examined results
for our test data set to see if the presence of such third-
party Flash cookies in the form of local shared object les
could be detected. In the data we did observe one such in-
stance where the Flash script le quant.swf was served by
the server flash.quantserve.com with subsequent URL re-
trievals back to this third-party server. This Flash script is
working similarly to one in JavaScript, but instead of saving
state using cookies, it is using one of these LSOs to save
state at the browser. Unfortunately, these cookies are not
controlled via standard privacy settings of browsers so a user
may not be aware they are even set.
4.3 Company Acquisitions
Apart from the growth of individual domains, acquisitions
in the industry over the course of our study have changed
the landscape and created families of companies that have
multiple perspectives of user viewing habits. Table 1 shows a
list of third-party acquisitions by third-party parent domains
with a presence in at least 1% of rst-party servers. The list
was compiled by the authors using information gleaned from
public announcements.
Table 1: Known Acquisitions of Third-Party Do-
mains By Parent Companies
Parent Acquired Date
AOL advertising.com Jun'04
tacoda.net Jul'07
adsonar.com Dec'07
Doubleclick falkag.net Mar'06
Google youtube.com Oct'06
doubleclick.net Mar'07
feedburner.com Jun'07
Microsoft aquantive.com May'07
(atdmt.com)
Omniture oermatica.com Sep'07
hitbox.com Oct'07
Valueclick mediaplex.com Oct'01
fastclick.net Sep'05
Yahoo overture.com Dec'03
yieldmanager.com Apr'07
adrevolver.com Oct'07
Using the data of Table 1 we can follow the growth both
in terms of internal expansion and external acquisitions for
prominent third-party companies. In the following, the fam-
ilies are presented in order of the resulting size measured in
terms of penetration within our set of rst-party servers.
Figure 2 shows the growth of the Google family of domains
over the course of our study. Within each epoch, two sets of
bars are shown. The right-most bar contains constituent
members of Google at each epoch. Thus in Oct'05, the
primary extent of Google was due to googlesyndication.
com, although moving to Oct'06 google-analytics.com was
uniquely used on more rst-party servers with some sites
having an overlap of more than one Google domain. Moving
forward in time, the Google domains googleadservices.
com, google.com and googleapis.com serve some third-party
content.
The left-most bars in each domain show the extent of non-
Google domains that are eventually acquired by Google.
The most prominent is doubleclick.net, which includes
2mdn.net and the acquisition of falkag.net after Mar'06.
After the acquisition of Doubleclick by Google in Mar'07
the extent of the Google family shows a sharp increase in
our Feb'08 epoch. After the acquisition, doubleclick.net
and google-analytics.com each contribute signicantly to
reach of this family of domains with the large overlap pri-
marily due to rst-party servers employing both of these
domains. The end result is that in the Sep'08 epoch, the
Google family has a reach of nearly 60% amongst the set
of domains in our core test data set|the highest among all
third parties by far.
Figure 3 shows the growth of the Omniture family of 0
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Figure 2: Growth of the Google Family
domains. This family has grown through the increase use
of Omniture third-party servers, primarily the 2o7.net do-
main, as well as the acquisition of the offermatica.com and
hitbox.com domains. In Sep'08 the family has a reach of
28% with most of it due to the original omniture.com do-
main.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
Oct’05 Apr’06 Oct’06 Feb’08 Sep’08
F
i
r
s
t
-
P
a
r
t
y
 
S
e
r
v
e
r
 
E
x
t
e
n
t
 
(
%
)
Time Epochs
*includes omniture.com and 2o7.net
overlap
hitbox
offermatica
omniture*
Omniture Family
Figure 3: Growth of the Omniture Family
Figure 4 shows the growth of the Microsoft family over
the course of our study. This family of domains has a reach
of 22% in Sep'08 with its growth due almost entirely to the
acquisition of Aquantive and its atdmt.com domain.
Figures 5 and 6 track the nal two signicant families,
Yahoo and AOL, over the course of our study. Yahoo has
a reach of 15% in Sep'08 with much of its growth due to
the acquisition of the yieldmanager.com domain. AOL has
a reach of over 14% in Sep'08 due to two acquisitions in
2007 and its acquisition of advertising.com prior to the
beginning of our study. Valueclick, the last family listed in
Table 1, has a much smaller extent of 4% in Sep'08 and is
not shown.
Once acquisitions are assigned to their respective parent
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Figure 4: Growth of the Microsoft Family
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Figure 5: Growth of the Yahoo Family
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Figure 6: Growth of the AOL Familycompany, Figure 7 takes a similar approach as Figure 1 of
rst showing the extent of the top-10 family during each
epoch and the top families for the Sep'08 epoch. Relative to
Figure 1, 2mdn.net is merged into doubleclick.net, which
is then merged into the Google family along with the domain
google-analytics.com. Similarly, atdmt.com becomes part
of the Microsoft family and 2o7.net part of the Omniture
family. The results show that acquisitions have helped to
create the ve families of domains with highest penetration
with quantserve.com and revsci.net being the two inde-
pendent domains with the highest penetration.
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Figure 7: Extent of Top-10 Third-Party Families in
Each Epoch and Specic Contribution of Top Fam-
ilies
4.4 Depth of Third-Party Penetration
Another way to understand the extent of third-party pen-
etration is to examine the depth of these domains by de-
termining how many independent families and domains are
associated with each rst-party server. For this analysis, we
rst assigned each root domain and then determined all fam-
ilies with at least a one-percent penetration for each epoch.
We then analyzed the number of these top third-party fami-
lies that are associated with each rst-party server. Results
of this analysis are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Depth of Top Third-Party Penetration
Amongst First-Party Servers (%)
% 1st-Party Servers w/
Time No. Top 3rd-Party Domains
Epoch  1  2  3  4  5
Oct'05 53 24 12 5 1
Apr'06 63 35 19 10 2
Oct'06 66 38 23 13 6
Feb'08 76 47 29 18 10
Sep'08 81 52 34 24 14
The results show that the percentage of rst-party servers
with multiple top third-party domains has risen from 24% in
Oct'05 to 52% in Sep'08. This increase has occurred despite
the merger of previously independent domains through ac-
quisitions. This increase is signicant because it shows that
now for a majority of these rst-party servers, users are be-
ing tracked by two and more third-party entities.
4.5 Extent of Company Familiesin Consumer
Sites
In addition to the broad set of popular sites we use in
our study, we also wanted to focus on consumer sites which
a large number of users are likely to visit in order to make
purchases rather than simply browse. These sites elicit more
information about users who are less likely to be browsing
anonymously as compared to, say, news Web sites. In order
to make use of our longitudinal data we identied a subset
of 127 test data set sites across the Alexa categories for
examination in this portion of our study. Results for this
subset of consumer sites are shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Extent of Top-10 Third-Party Families in
Each Epoch and Specic Contribution of Top Fam-
ilies for Consumer Sites
The extent of top-10 third-party domains is comparable to
Figure 7, although there is variation in the extent of specic
domains. The Google family is still the largest in Sep'08, but
smaller than across all rst-party servers while the Omniture
family is larger for consumer sites.
Also interesting is two third-party domains that are in
the Sep'08 top-10 for consumer sites. These sites were not
shown in Figure 8 to reduce the visual complexity of the
graph. The domain abmr.net has a 6% extent in Sep'08. It
is signicant because it is owned by Akamai and tracks users
via third-party cookies. Given that in Sep'08 66% of rst-
party servers were using Akamai's CDN service to directly
serve rst-party or indirectly serve third-party content, the
introduction of a CDN-based tracking service has potential
privacy impact. The presence of this domain, which was
rst observed in the Feb'08 epoch, coincides with a patent
application from Akamai on data collection in a CDN [15].
Another domain with a 6% extent is specificclick.net,
domain for Specic Media. It was recently reported that
Specic Media has created proles on more than 175 mil-
lion individual users [21]. Its higher presence in consumer
sites compared to the larger set of sites indicates that con-sumer sites tend to be more valuable for this type of prole
tracking.
4.6 Extent of Company Families in Fiduciary
Sites
We also examined another set of sets, originally used in [13]|
Web sites involving the managing of personal duciary in-
formation. Users provide private information such as credit
cards and bank account numbers to such sites. We used the
81 sites from [13] across nine categories: credit, nancial, in-
surance, medical, mortgage, shopping, subscription, travel,
and utility. Longitudinal results for these sites over three
epochs are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Extent of Top-10 Third-Party Families in
Each Epoch and Specic Contribution of Top Fam-
ilies for Fiduciary Sites
The tone of these results is similar to what we found for
the consumer sites although the extent of the top-10 third-
party families in each epoch is a bit less. Given the increased
privacy concerns that users have with sites such as those
involving medical and nancial concerns, the extents are still
large.
4.7 Impact of Currency of Category Member-
ship
Finally, we investigated the impact of changing member-
ship in the Alexa categories used as the basis for our study.
The membership of these categories was originally obtained
in 2005 so an obvious question is whether the results change
if we use current membership for the categories.
For this work we retrieved the membership of 15 Alexa
categories [3] of popular sites in 2008. Twelve of these cate-
gories were in common with those we retrieved in 2005: arts,
business, computers, games, health, home, news, recreation,
reference, regional, science, and shopping. The 2005 mem-
bership of these twelve categories represented 1068 unique
URLs while the 2008 membership represented 1111 unique
URLs. Of these counts, there was an overlap of 625 URLs,
thus nearly 60% of the URLs in 2005 were still popular in
2008.
The URLs for these twelve categories using the 2005 and
2008 memberships were each retrieved in Sep'08 and ana-
lyzed. The top-10 extent and the top families in Sep'08 are
shown in Table 3 for the two membership periods.
Table 3: Top Third-Party Family Extent Among
First-Party Servers for 2008 and 2005 Period Mem-
berships(%)
Membership
Third-Party Domain 2008 2005
top-10 79.4 78.7
Google 60.9 57.7
Omniture 33.8 30.0
Microsoft 24.4 22.7
Yahoo 15.8 14.9
AOL 15.6 14.8
quantserve.com 12.4 11.3
revsci.net 10.8 9.2
The results show that despite the membership changes
between the two time periods, the new membership results
are consistent with the old with similar ordering and mag-
nitude of the extent of the top-10 third-party domains. The
extent of the third-party domains for the 2008 membership
is consistently greater for the top third-party domains.
5. LIMITATIONSOFPROTECTIONTECH-
NIQUES
Given the increasing penetration of third-party domains
on popular Web sites, an obvious question is the eectiveness
of potential actions that a user can take to protect against
privacy diusion. Prior work in [11] implemented and ex-
amined tradeos between eectiveness and page quality for
a range of approaches with the best general approaches lim-
iting the download of third-party content such as cookies,
JavaScript and identifying URLs. The work found that re-
stricting rst-party content, cookies or JavaScript led to er-
rors or sharper reductions in visual quality when download-
ing a page.
As a result, the obvious approach for a user interested
in protecting their privacy is to not allow third-party cook-
ies, which is a privacy option available in browsers; disal-
low third-party JavaScript execution through tools such as
Firefox's NoScript extension [17]; and block known third-
party identifying URL content using a tool such as Adblock
Plus [1].
While each of these techniques does work, a careful anal-
ysis of how third-party aggregator sites are tracking users
shows that all of these techniques are limited in their eec-
tiveness for protecting users. Results of this analysis across
the ve time epochs of our study are shown in Figure 10
where third-party domain servers are increasingly \hiding"
their content in rst-party domain servers.
The rst result is that third-party aggregators are not only
using third-party cookies to track users as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2, but these aggregators are using rst-party cookies
to store information about a user's accesses to the rst-party
site. These rst-party cookies are actually set by third-party
JavaScript code such as urchin.js of google-analytics.
com or Omniture's s_code.js. As shown in the FirstPar-
tyCookies result of Figure 10 the percentage of rst-party
servers that have rst-party cookies set and used by third-
party JavaScript has grown to nearly 60% of all rst-party 0
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Figure 10: Growth of Hidden Third-Party Content
servers over the course of our study. These rst-party cook-
ies are much harder for a user to not accept because doing so
for all rst-party cookies causes some rst-party site access
to break.
A related issue is the source of the JavaScript code that
is used for tracking. One source is a third-party server,
such as the case where urchin.js is typically served by
the third-party server www.google-analytics.com. In such
cases it is possible to use a URL blocker or NoScript ex-
tension to prevent download/execution of the code. Alter-
nately, other third-party JavaScript code is actually served
by a rst-party server. For example on the rst-party site
abc.go.com, Omniture's JavaScript code is served by the
server a.abc.com, which is a rst-party server as conrmed
by its ADNS. These cases are much harder to automatically
block and as shown in the FirstPartyJS results in Figure 10
now occur for over 30% of rst-party servers. This gure
is conservative as it is based on the extent of well-known
names for tracking JavaScript code that we could identify in
our data.
The outcome for executing one of these tracking JavaScript
codes is the generation of an identifying URL that is \re-
quested"from a third-party server in order to pass informa-
tion back to the third-party domain. For example, urchin.js
causes a 503-byte identifying URL to be sent to www.google-
analytics.com in order to retrieve a 35-byte image. Again
blocking such identifying URLs is possible when the URL is
sent to a well-known third-party server, but increasingly this
request is being sent to an apparent rst-party server. For
example, the Omniture JavaScript code on abc.go.com gen-
erates an identifying URL for the server w88.go.com, which
is in the same domain as the rst-party server, but based
on its ADNS is actually part of the Omniture network. Fig-
ure 10 shows that now close to 20% of rst-party servers in
our data set contain such third-party objects that are \hid-
den" in what look to be rst-party servers.
The bottom line is that identifying and blocking third-
party content used for tracking is increasingly dicult as
these third-parties work with rst-party sites to place such
content in servers that are or appear to be part of the rst-
party site. However these \rst-party" servers are simply a
DNS alias for what is actually a third-party server. This
approach makes for limitations of current tools that protect
based on URL or server name to accurately identify what
content to block. This is a similar \cat and mouse" game as
we discussed in previous work on ads [12].
This game is also not limited to third-party sites doing
analytics. Third-party sites doing behavioral tracking could
deploy their content on what appear to be rst-party domain
servers and make use of rst-party cookies to track users
across rst-party sites without any apparent use of third-
party content or cookies. While we saw little evidence of
this approach in our data, we would expect approaches like
this to be used if enough users stop allowing third-party
cookies.
Additional privacy protection tools are being made avail-
able in browsers. Microsoft has announced its InPrivate
mode for IE8 [2] and Google has a similar \incognito" mode
in its new Chrome browser [8]|this was originally available
on Macintoshes. In each case, when a user invokes these
modes then the browser does not save the user's browsing
history, cookies and other data. These tools are directed at
\over-the-shoulder privacy" from others with access to the
computer rather than protecting privacy from third parties
as the capability to block cookies is already available. In-
Private does have capabilities to establish a favorites list for
preservation of cookies, but this feature requires active man-
agement of sites to add or the need to switch in and out of
the InPrivate mode. The mode also automatically detects
when a user has been \seen" by more than ten third-party
sites, but as our results show detection of a third-party can-
not always be done by string matching alone so the value of
this feature is not clear.
6. DISCUSSION
So far in this paper, we have examined well-known tech-
niques for gathering privacy related information about users
and the degree of penetration in popular Web sites. We have
also examined the role of cookies and JavaScript as well
as the potential for blocking diusion of private informa-
tion. The examination of acquisitions of companies points
to the potential of signicant growth in aggregate data. In
particular, the acquiring company has older data that they
could not have otherwise obtained. By purchasing behav-
ioral data from the past, the acquiring company is able to
get a broader idea about the behavior of users over time
which can be helpful to predict future trends. The ability to
link (or \fuse") such data with other information heightens
the risk of converting user-neutral data into personally iden-
tiable information. Our work has examined diusion of pri-
vate information at the level of Web site access. Most of this
information happens relatively transparently although users
may be aware of presence of cookies. The use of cookies (es-
pecially third-party cookies) and extraction of information
via JavaScript is generally opaque to users.
Beyond the sites they visit, there is a great deal of private
information that users supply to many Web sites. We exam-
ine a broad subset of these with a view of how data fusion
could occur between the private information collection that
we have examined thus far.
Search engines typically record the search strings entered
by users and some search sites even make the history of
past searches available to the user. Ask.com has a feature
to erase the past searches. Rare exceptions like the newcuil.com search site explicitly indicate that no information
about users is gathered or maintained [4]. However, most
search sites can and do record information supplied by users.
The problem gets a bit more complex when we examine
the popular free Web email services. These services require
users to acknowledge that they accept a Terms of Services
agreement, which spells out how a user's private information
will be treated. The social graph of a user can be constructed
simply by mining the set of their communicants.
Toolbars are another potential source of privacy leakage.
For example, MSN and Yahoo have toolbars available for In-
ternet Explorer with optional features to help these compa-
nies to provide better service by sending information about
visited URLs to these sites. The Google toolbar (which
comes pre-installed on any Dell PC [18]) has a feature show-
ing the page rank of each page visited by a user. This rank
is determined via a request, with attached cookie, to Google
for each URL visited by a user.
As previously discussed, Google's new browser Chrome
has an Incognito privacy feature, but has other features that
raise privacy concerns [5]. All partial URLs or queries typed
into Chrome are sent (by default) to Google and completion
suggestions are generated. Thus, Google can record the list
of URLs users attempt to visit even if there is no link be-
tween these Web sites and Google. The retention policy for
these data is not specied in the browser's privacy policy.
Another potential source to gather information is online
social networks (OSNs). One of these, (orkut.com), is part
of the Google family of domains. In addition, we found
in [14] that the third-party domains found in popular Web
sites are also prominent in the popular OSNs that we stud-
ied.
The top few family of domains that we discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3, also operate search and free email services (AOL,
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo) and deliver cookies as part of
these services. Thus the potential for combining information
available to them from registered users clearly exists|for
example linking the information available from any of these
services with data aggregated from Web traversals. At the
minimum, behavioral marketing introduces what has been
termed the \creepiness factor" [20] where users see ads tar-
geted not just on books that are bought, but on medical
conditions that are looked up.
7. SECONDARY PRIVACY DAMAGE
One of the new issues we are concerned about that does
not appear to have been raised in the privacy literature is
that of secondary privacy diusion. In all the diusion we
have discussed thus far, the aected person is the one brows-
ing the Web. The notion of secondary leakages arises when
privacy related to other users are either deliberately or in-
advertently leaked. Even if the original user is libertarian
and does not mind their private information leaking, they
should not be contributing to diusion of other people's pri-
vacy. We give examples of this phenomenon here.
Earlier in Section 6, we referred to the potential construc-
tion of social graph by Web-based email services. Without
the recipient's knowledge or consent, the communication be-
tween the rst user (someone who has acceded to the Terms
of Service) is available to the email service. If the recipient
replies to the email then the contents of the response are
also available without the second user ever being aware of
the privacy policy of the email service.
Some Internet services allow customers to provide email
addresses of other Internet users so that these other users
can be invited to an event or to send copies of restricted on-
line articles to non-subscribers. Event organizing sites host
content of interest to the event which can be updated by
the invited parties. However, the supplied addresses become
known to the service without any prior approval necessarily
obtained from these other Internet users resulting in sec-
ondary leakage. The relationship between the supplier of
the email address and non-subscribers can be stored by the
article site. For example, the forwarding of a news article
of restricted sites to someone else may give an indication of
the recipient's interest or political leanings.
Sites that allow tagging of pictures may store information
about named users. The user-generated tags create link-
ages around the content of the picture or may provide other
relationship information (e.g. parent, sibling, etc) between
users.
Currently, there is no way to prevent secondary leakage
before it occurs. However, if there is information about
users who were unaware of their information leaked by oth-
ers without their knowledge or consent, then monitoring
sources of public information (public Web sites, social net-
work pages, blogs) can help identify such leakage post facto.
Such detection can lead to the user being notied and the
user can decide if such privacy leakage is acceptable. If not,
the party that is the source of such public information can
be notied to prevent future leakage.
It should be noted that the same aggregators who track
the movement of users across the Web can also gather avail-
able information about other users.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we used our long-term data to present a longi-
tudinal analysis of privacy diusion on the Web. This is the
rst study to measure this diusion over an extended period
of time. The results from the study show that penetration of
the top-10 third-party servers tracking user viewing habits
across a large set of popular Web sites has grown from 40%
in Oct'05 to 70% in Sep'08.
During the same time period of this increased privacy
diusion, we observe a number of family of domains that
have been created through acquisitions of one company by
another. These acquisitions have decreased the number of
popular independent third-party domains. The overall share
of the top-ve families: Google, Omniture, Microsoft, Yahoo
and AOL extends to more than 75% of our core test set with
Google alone having a penetration of nearly 60%.
Not only are these families and other third-party domains
represented broadly across our set of rst-party sites, but
the depth of this representation has increased to the point
that in Sep'08 a majority of our rst-party sites made use of
two or more third-parties. This result is signicant because
it shows users are being tracked by multiple entities when
accessing a rst-party site.
Finally we found that existing privacy protection tech-
niques have limitations in preventing privacy diusion. These
techniques work by restricting the download of third-party
content in the form of cookies, JavaScript and identifying
URLs, but our results show that increasingly third-party ag-
gregators are working to hide their presence in a rst-party
site by serving content from what are or appear to be rst-
party servers. This approach makes it dicult for tools thatprotect based on URL or server name and will likely increase
in use as more users deploy privacy protection techniques.
The aggregation of tracking data, particularly by the fam-
ilies we identify, is of concern because of the other sources of
user data that these families have available to them. Search
terms, email services and toolbars are only some of the ad-
ditional sources of information about users available to fam-
ilies such as AOL, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo that be
linked with tracking data. Services such as email and so-
cial networking sites are also opportunities for secondary
privacy leakage where private information about a user is
made available to the service or public without the consent
of the user.
Future work includes continuing to monitor the presence
and activities of third-party aggregators. We have seen ap-
proaches evolve and expect that they will continue to evolve
as there is a cat and mouse game between users interested
in privacy protection and companies interested in gathering
data. We plan to continue examining the relationship be-
tween tracking data and whether it can be fused with PII.
Finally we plan to further examine the extent of secondary
privacy leakage along with measures to limit its impact.
9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Trevor Jim and other anonymous reviewers for
their comments on earlier versions of the paper.
10. REFERENCES
[1] Adblock plus: Save your time and trac.
http://adblockplus.org/.
[2] C. Albanesius. Microsoft tips IE8 privacy features,
August 26 2008.
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2328900,00.asp.
[3] Alexa: Most popular web sites. http://www.alexa.com/.
[4] Cuil - your privacy. http://www.cuil.com/privacy/.
[5] W. Davis. Polish on google's new chrome tarnished by
privacy questions, September 2, 2008.
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/index.cfm?fa=
Articles.showArticle&art_aid=89743.
[6] S. DeDeo. Pagestats, May 2006.
http://www.cs.wpi.edu/~cew/pagestats/.
[7] European union directive 95/46/EC. http:
//www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive.html,
Nov. 1995.
[8] A. Greenberg. Going `incongnito' can you really web
browse on the down low?, September 5, 2008.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/157293?tid=relatedcl.
[9] I'm A Super.Com. Flash cookies: The silent privacy
killer, October 9 2008.
http://www.imasuper.com/66/technology/
flash-cookies-the-silent-privacy-killer/.
[10] C. Jackson, A. Bortz, D. Boneh, and J. C. Mitchell.
Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks. In
Proceedings of the International World Wide Web
Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2006.
[11] B. Krishnamurthy, D. Malandrino, and C. E. Wills.
Measuring privacy loss and the impact of privacy
protection in web browsing. In Proceedings of the
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pages
52{63, Pittsburgh, PA USA, July 2007.
[12] B. Krishnamurthy and C. Wills. Cat and mouse:
Content delivery tradeos in web access. In
Proceedings of the International World Wide Web
Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2006.
[13] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills. Generating a
privacy footprint on the Internet. In Proceedings of
IMC, October 2006.
[14] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills. Characterizing
privacy in online social networks. In Proceedings of the
Workshop on Online Social Networks, pages 37{42,
Seattle, WA USA, August 2008. ACM.
[15] Michael Afergan and Thomson Leighton and Timothy
Johnson and Brian Mancuso and Ken Iwamoto.
Method of data collection among participating content
providers in a distributed network, 2008. United
States Patent Application 20080092058.
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/y2008/0092058.html.
[16] Mike On Ads. How do behavioral networks work?,
February 28 2007. http://www.mikeonads.com/2007/02/
28/how-do-behavioral-networks-work/.
[17] Noscript. https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/722/.
[18] S. Olsen and T. Krazit. Dell embraces google, May 25,
2006. http://news.cnet.com/Dell-embraces-Google/
2100-1032_3-6077051.html.
[19] Pests clasied in the category tracking cookie. http://
www.pestpatrol.com/zks/pestinfo/tracking_cookie.asp.
[20] Privacy on the web: Is it a losing battle?, June 25,
2008. Published in Knowledge@Wharton.
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?
articleid=1999.
[21] P. Whoriskey. Candidates' web sites get to know the
voters presidential campaigns tailor, target ads based
on visitors' online habits, August 30 2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/08/29/AR2008082903178_pf.html.
[22] Consumer tips: How to opt-out of cookies that track
you.
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/cookieoptout.html.